| 1 | """ ######################################################################## |
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| 2 | Short introduction to RSA encryption, signature and blinding. |
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| 3 | License: GPL |
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| 4 | Copyright: Nils Toedtmann 2007 <nils@opencoin.net> |
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| 5 | Joerg Baach <mail1@baach.de> |
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| 6 | Version: 2007-11-25-04 |
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| 7 | ######################################################################## |
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| 8 | |
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| 9 | Preliminary note you may or may not skip: |
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| 10 | |
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| 11 | All calculations will be executed modulo some natural number N. Maths |
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| 12 | calls the set {0,..,N-1} together with the operations +, - and * the |
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| 13 | "ring of residues modulo N". These operations are the same as for |
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| 14 | integers plus the "mod" operation (ok, i simplify a bit ;-) |
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| 15 | |
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| 16 | A number is invertible modulo N (= you can divide by it modulo N) iff |
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| 17 | it is coprime to N (= y and N have no common divisor). But in contrast |
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| 18 | to +, - and *, the division is quite different. So telling python |
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| 19 | |
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| 20 | x_divided_by_y_modulo_N = x / y % N |
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| 21 | |
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| 22 | does not work. We use a slightly altered "extended euclidian algorithm" |
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| 23 | (usually used to compute the GCD of two numbers) for division mod N |
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| 24 | (see devide below) |
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| 25 | |
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| 26 | ######################################################################## |
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| 27 | RSA 1: KEY GENERATION |
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| 28 | |
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| 29 | Bob (key owner) selects two random primes (~1024bits) and calculates |
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| 30 | their product (~2048bits, "RSA key size") which will be our modulus N. |
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| 31 | Except key generation *all* computations will be %N. |
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| 32 | |
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| 33 | >>> p = 37 |
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| 34 | >>> q = 61 |
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| 35 | >>> N = p* q |
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| 36 | |
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| 37 | The key pair are two numbers <N such that |
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| 38 | |
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| 39 | public_key * secret_key == 1 modulo (p-1)*(q-1) |
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| 40 | |
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| 41 | It is unfeasible without knowing the factorization of N, but knowing |
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| 42 | p and q just select a random public_key and invert it. If it turns out |
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| 43 | to be not coprime to (p-1)(q-1), select an other public_key. |
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| 44 | |
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| 45 | >>> public_key = 101 |
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| 46 | >>> secret_key = divide(1,public_key,(p-1)*(q-1)) |
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| 47 | |
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| 48 | ######################################################################## |
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| 49 | RSA 2: ENCRYPTION |
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| 50 | |
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| 51 | Alice (sender) select's Message <N to send. Fetches Bob's public key |
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| 52 | (including the modulus N) and encrypts with it. |
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| 53 | |
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| 54 | >>> cleartext = 1465 |
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| 55 | >>> ciphertext = cleartext**public_key % N |
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| 56 | |
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| 57 | Bob (receiver) decrypts using his secret key. Should gain ClearText. |
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| 58 | |
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| 59 | >>> decryptedtext = ciphertext**secret_key %N |
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| 60 | >>> decryptedtext == cleartext |
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| 61 | True |
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| 62 | |
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| 63 | ######################################################################## |
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| 64 | RSA 3: SIGNATURE |
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| 65 | |
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| 66 | Bob (signer) select's Message <N (usually the hash of a longer text) and |
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| 67 | signs it using his secret key. |
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| 68 | |
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| 69 | >>> message = 755 |
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| 70 | >>> signature = message**secret_key %N |
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| 71 | |
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| 72 | Alice (verifier) verifies using Bob's public key. Should gain Message. |
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| 73 | |
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| 74 | >>> verified_signature = signature**public_key %N |
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| 75 | >>> verified_signature == message |
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| 76 | True |
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| 77 | |
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| 78 | |
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| 79 | ######################################################################## |
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| 80 | RSA 4: BLIND SIGNATURE |
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| 81 | |
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| 82 | Alice (requester) selects a blank <N she wants the issuer to sign and a |
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| 83 | random number ("blinder") for blinding. She creates the blind and keeps |
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| 84 | the blinder secret: |
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| 85 | |
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| 86 | >>> blank = 12 |
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| 87 | >>> blinder = 101 |
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| 88 | >>> blind = blank * (blinder**public_key) %N |
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| 89 | |
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| 90 | Bob (issuer) signs the blind with his secret key |
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| 91 | |
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| 92 | >>> signature_of_blind = blind**secret_key %N |
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| 93 | |
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| 94 | Alice unblinds the signed blind |
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| 95 | |
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| 96 | >>> unblinded_signature_of_blind= divide( signature_of_blind, blinder, N ) |
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| 97 | |
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| 98 | If somebody had the requester's blank *and* the issuer's secret key, |
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| 99 | he could have directly computed this: |
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| 100 | |
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| 101 | >>> signature_of_blank = blank**secret_key %N |
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| 102 | >>> unblinded_signature_of_blind == signature_of_blank |
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| 103 | True |
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| 104 | |
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| 105 | Alice uses the ususal signature verification algorithm: |
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| 106 | |
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| 107 | >>> (unblinded_signature_of_blind**public_key %N) == blank |
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| 108 | True |
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| 109 | """ |
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| 110 | |
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| 111 | |
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| 112 | from eea import divide |
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| 113 | |
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| 114 | |
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| 115 | def _test(): |
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| 116 | import doctest |
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| 117 | doctest.testmod() |
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| 118 | |
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| 119 | if __name__ == "__main__": |
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| 120 | _test() |
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